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Although the question of Aldous Huxley’s attitude towards the state systems depicted in 
Brave New World (1932) remains the stuff of fierce debate, the technocratic features of that 
state have long been recognized by scholars, students, and general readers alike. Indeed, 
Brave New World is often grouped with Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) as one of the twentieth 
century’s most compelling representations of ‘the threat posed by technocracy and 
totalitarianism to civil society’, Huxley’s grey future reminding its readers of the power of 
technology and the allure it holds for those who seek to use technical expertise for political 
goals.1 As this quotation indicates, scholars tend to interpret this future as a scenario 
depicting the systematic and objectionable purging of individual liberty. Evelyn Cobley, for 
instance, writing about Brave New World in relation to the Ford Motor Company, proposes 
that Huxley’s text ‘associates the assembly line with the utopian dream of the perfect society 
that devolves into the dystopian nightmare of the totalitarian state.’2 Technocracy – rule or 
government by a class of technical specialists – is in these terms an object of Huxley’s satire, 
something the text queries rather than celebrates. And yet at other times Huxley’s support for 
illiberal sentiments comes to the fore. Hence David Bradshaw’s claim that for ‘all its 
hideousness, the hierarchical, aseptic, colour-coded world of A.F. 632 is not aeons away from 
the scientific utopia Huxley was promoting elsewhere before, during and after he wrote Brave 
New World in 1931’ (BNW xxii). This approach foregrounds the text’s ambivalence. It asks 
us to decide whether Huxley’s apparent mockery of a politics based on scientific knowledge 
co-exists with an approval of technocratic authority. Different readings of Huxley’s account 
of technocracy diverge on the nature of his response to technocracy, in other words, yet agree 
that a response exists. Brave New World may analyse technocracy this way or that. Analyse 
technocracy, however, the text unarguably and unforgettably does. 
The purpose of this chapter is to re-contextualize that analysis in relation to a little-
studied corpus of historical materials, specifically by comparing Brave New World with 
Harold Loeb’s Life in a Technocracy: What It Might Be Like (1933), one of the most 
fascinating documents to emerge from the early 1930s American Technocracy movement and 
an important inter-war statement of utopian principles. The ‘soundly scientific’ goal of 
American Technocracy, as H. G. Wells put it in The Shape of Things to Come (1933), was ‘to 
restate economics on a purely physical basis’ and to implement ‘a new social order in which 
social and economic life was to be treated as an energy system controlled by “experts”.’3 
Following the movement’s fragmenting into opposed factions in January 1933, Loeb’s Life in 
a Technocracy – a discursive ‘fantasy’, as he called it – drew up one version of that system in 
which the arts played a central role.4 Against Loeb stood Howard Scott, the thirty-year-old 
engineer around whom the movement first coalesced in New York circa 1919. Throughout 
the 1930s Scott and his allies, including the scientist M. King Hubbert, outlined an anti-
aesthetic political system that saw the arts as a wasteful continuation of the capitalism that 
Technocracy sought to dethrone.5 Whereas Loeb was a committed supporter of the arts, a 
defender of Western cultural history, and a founder of the little magazine Broom: An 
International Magazine of the Arts (1921–4), Scott claimed that ‘European culture and 
traditions [had] nothing of worth-while importance to offer America in [the] twilight period 
preceding the dawn of a new era.’6 The pamphlet Technocracy: Some Questions Answered 
(1934), which carried an enthusiastic ‘Foreword’ by Hubbert, stopped short of criticizing 
artists in this way, but noticeably did not include them among the ‘intelligent, functionally 
capable’ people engaged in ‘socially useful’ occupations whom American Technocracy 
welcomed with open arms.7 Loeb’s distinctiveness as a contrasting Technocratic voice is well 
established, particularly as one who provides a liberal perspective in contrast to Scott, 
Hubbert, and those with similarly anti-aesthetic tendencies, but the broad connections 
between Brave New World and Life in a Technocracy have yet to be recorded.8  
Although it is a commonplace that Huxley took a qualified interest in technocratic 
ideas – among them scientific managerialism, Fordian industrialism, eugenicism, and 
Wellsian socialism – before, during, and after the composition of Brave New World, placing 
his work specifically in relation to the American Technocracy movement allows us to 
formulate a new perspective on the tension between art and technocratic control that Loeb 
and Huxley diagnosed as a key problem of post-Fordian modernity. Brave New World 
conceives the relationship between technology and the arts relationally. It suggests that if the 
machine age tends to subordinate aesthetic beauty to rhetorics of efficiency and central 
planning, such rhetorics may also be a necessary counterpart to more creative spaces hived 
off from, yet at the mercy of, technocratic systems (as those who are exiled to Iceland and 
elsewhere prove). Life in a Technocracy takes a comparable line, imagining technocracy as a 
means with which to make the arts flourish and thus to create a society that would transform 
‘the gusto of competition inherent in man’ into regenerative ‘life values’ (LT 169). That 
viewpoint put Loeb at odds with Scott and brought him close to the Huxley who suggested in 
‘Pascal’, published in Do What You Will (1929), that the ‘fine arts and the arts of life have 
flourished most luxuriantly in those societies in which a very sharp distinction was drawn 
between mechanic and liberal occupations’ (HCE2 369), a view that pithily anticipates the 
corporatist viewpoint elaborated more fully in Life in a Technocracy.  
By the time Huxley made this remark he had long doubted the ‘mechanic’ as a 
criterion for socio-political engineering. In a 1926 letter to John St. Loe Strachey, for 
instance, he outlined his anxieties regarding the ‘prestige of science’ and the concomitant 
view that ‘the measurable’, rather than qualitative, ‘aspect of the world is [its] total reality’ 
(AHSL 186). Huxley had also by this point established many of his concerns about the ever-
more rationalized qualities of machine-age society and the purpose of art within it. When he 
wrote Brave New World his disquiet at such issues was still evident. Yet he had also become 
convinced that the ethic of the machine called democracy into question. At this point in time, 
Huxley openly favoured caste-based social models that preserved intellectual aristocracies 
and embraced autocratic governance, and was increasingly drawn to eugenics (see HH vii–
xxiii). He suggested in ‘Machinery, Psychology, and Politics’ (1929) that the age of the 
machine demanded an efficient ‘factory-like political organization’, but he remained 
uncertain about the long-term effects of such proposals upon ‘the psychology of the 
individual human being’ (HCE3 220), and, consequently, upon the creative spirit. Huxley 
was similarly torn about science, which after the Wall Street Crash he was keen to see 
‘applied by humanists’ (HCE 155), as he put it in ‘Science and Civilization’ (1932), in order 
to bring civilization back from the brink of chaos, even though he suspected that science was 
more likely to be used by ‘economists’ to standardize the world and ‘to train up a race […] of 
perfect mass-producers and mass-consumers’ than it was to be used to create a ‘deliberately 
progressive’ society, ‘consciously tending towards the realization of the highest human 
aspirations’ (HCE3 150). Brave New World dramatizes these antagonisms: it charts the 
systematic purging of finely wrought aesthetic forms in a society where benevolent 
dictatorship has generated political stability by jettisoning the ‘waste’ of art and liberal 
democracy, and by limiting the use of science to functional applications as opposed to the 
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. As a fictional narrative, therefore, the text is 
profoundly unresolved. Indeed, the text’s formal contradictions imply that Brave New World 
designates the high arts as a source of value, and this gesture, as I will show, registers 
Huxley’s closeness to Loeb’s account of technocracy, a philosophy from which many modern 
commentators would want to distance him. 
In the World State, A.F. 632, high art is an awkward, unwanted reminder of 
‘gratuitous’ (BNW 18), non-utilitarian culture. Particular versions of socio-political stability 
and happiness that limit the prominence and attractiveness of such culture have been 
facilitated by machine systems, consumerism, anti-individualism, and mass entertainment. 
Under this post-Fordian regime, what used to be called high art – here symbolic of the 
judicious, rational, yet tortured world of the creative mind – has been replaced with cultural 
forms that satisfy the lustful needs of the glands, and which call to mind Huxley’s deep-
rooted concerns, to quote him in ‘The Outlook for American Culture: Some Reflections in a 
Machine Age’ (1927), about ‘go[ing] the American way’ (HCE3 185). Where technocracy 
seeks efficiency and permanence, high art, at least in the eyes of Mustapha Mond, creates 
disorganization and chaos. For the intelligent, observant Mond, high art is a symptom of an 
unstable, self-destructive past that has been superseded by the better future of sex and steel. 
Ancient Egyptian, Harappan, Semitic, Greek, and Roman sculpture and architecture; 
continental philosophy; English literature; European classical music – all such forms have in 
A.F. 632 become the victims of anti-historical imperatives. Unlike the socialist future of 
News from Nowhere (1890), where the healing potential of art has been channelled into the 
labour of ‘every man who produces’, in the World State to create artistically is to interfere 
with the technocratic principles that make citizens ‘sane, virtuous, [and] happy’ (BNW 35), 
even if such sanity, virtue, and happiness come at the cost of many individuals’ psychological 
uniqueness.9 ‘Gratuitous’ art is a danger, a source of personal expression that threatens the 
standardizing logics of collective life. As such it must be destroyed, concealed, or adapted to 
other purposes. New, functional things are better than old, beautiful things, bluntly put, 
despite the fact that from its title onwards Brave New World heralds the moral relevance of 
old things – Shakespeare, in this case – as a possible counter to the technocratic undertakings 
that have so drastically transformed humankind. 
 How we understand Huxley’s attitude towards these complexities depends in large 
part on how we approach the text’s account of the cultural forms produced under technocracy 
and the high art to which certain characters, such as Mond, oppose it. And as with much else 
in Brave New World, here ambiguities proliferate. Mond states that the price paid for stability 
in A.F. 632 is the loss of all those cathedrals, Renaissance plays, requiems, and symphonies 
(BNW 29) that Mond himself seems to respect, but which, like the philosophical, religious, 
and historical tomes kept in the cabinet in his study, are forms of ‘smut’ (BNW 207) that must 
be hidden from a world with rather different scruples. Theoretical science has suffered the 
same fate, its abstractions jettisoned in favour of disciplines fixed on ‘the most immediate 
problems of the moment’ (BNW 200). Utility has taken the place of beauty, commercialism 
has deposed individualism, and here Brave New World arguably channels the Huxley who in 
1930 bemoaned the influence of American culture upon its European counterparts, the latter 
falling prey, in his view, to the former’s standardizing advance. Indeed, the ‘religious respect 
for culture’ that Huxley sought to save from an ‘age of abounding rubbish’ (HCE3 49) 
parallels Mond’s dutiful preservation of high culture, both Huxley and Mond amounting in 
this regard to cognoscenti finding solace in art forms inaccessible to the common run of 
people. This is the reading of Brave New World offered by John Carey, who argues that the 
text implies ‘that mass happiness is inherently inferior. Only the solitary individual can 
experience happiness that is significant or profound.’10 The physical remnants of high art are 
locked away to contain their harmful teachings and thereby to maintain the hierarchies upon 
which social stability depends, those same hierarchies rendering high art unintelligible in an 
ahistorical society in which most people feed on entertainments that do little to challenge the 
mind. Only an aristocratic World Controller such as Mond has the necessary refinement to 
appreciate truth, beauty, and knowledge. Yet this very privileging of a certain kind of culture 
makes more noticeable the value of the high art that is not to be had. And in this respect the 
text queries the function of imagination and creativity in a world in which high art is 
dangerous enough to be put under lock and key but not so threatening as to be altogether 
obliterated. 
 So while on the one hand Brave New World presents an elitist viewpoint – high art is 
a thing of the past opposed to modern mass entertainments that can be treasured only by those 
intelligent enough to appreciate it – on the other it defensively suggests that under 
technocracy the fate of high art is to be something that can only be understood, but never 
openly revered, by a self-interested minority. High art is a sign of privilege (the elite lording 
it over the masses from their technocratic bastions) in the first instance, and a sign of 
besiegement (the elite being displaced by the masses) in the second. The only other option 
the text explores is for those who enjoy high culture or pure intellectualism, such as 
Helmholtz Watson, to be contained as exiles in places where the World State’s priorities have 
been abandoned and people maintain civilization in less regimented ways (see BNW 209). 
Mond, as a former, ‘pretty good’ (BNW 198) physicist who once questioned the dominant 
theories upon which science rests, represents the type of inquisitive mind interested in things 
for their own sake. In this sense he is an envoy of the realm of pure creativity, that place 
where things are made or explored with no subsequent goal in mind other than to relish the 
creative act itself. Yet rather than enjoy such things in the margins, or in exile, Mond chooses 
to serve the World State as one of its controllers, and therefore to safeguard the world’s 
collective, technocratic happiness despite the fact that such public loyalty negates his private 
contentment. Hence when Mond affectionately recalls his time as a physicist he sighs 
repeatedly at the memory (BNW 199–200), his attachment to the culture of the past echoing 
his fondness for his scientific training and the intellectual autonomy it facilitated. 
 Mond’s predicament focalizes the text’s broader investigation of the relationship 
between high art, ‘pure’ imagination, and technocracy. Of course, Huxley’s response to 
technocracy can, as we have seen, be construed divergently. Brave New World satirizes but is 
also something of a billet-doux for technocracy, a system of government to which Huxley 
was in many ways attracted during the text’s composition. However, Brave New World seems 
less undecided when it addresses, implicitly or otherwise, the value of high art in the face of 
technological modernity. In the World State the language of Shakespeare is firmly out of 
place, its profound sense of difference confusing and ostracizing John the Savage, rather than 
helping him decode his surroundings. In this way the text invites us to debate whether 
Shakespeare has any relevance at the end of a modernity featuring ‘the full flush of scientific 
utopia’, and to ask, if we think he does: ‘To whom does he speak?’11 But even if Brave New 
World investigates the relevance of Shakespeare in a future that seemingly has no use for 
Renaissance-era moralities, the text nevertheless invests in Shakespeare as an allusive 
resource (or artistic point of comparison). Huxley thereby very clearly signals Shakespeare’s 
appositeness as a cultural cipher with which to conceptualize the nature and potential 
problems of technocracy, despite the fact that the narrative queries at the diegetic level of its 
story the reliability of a Shakespearean moral compass. More interestingly, the very 
ambivalence of Brave New World on the matter of technocratic value might itself be read as a 
counter to technocratic utilitarianism, the lack of a snappily quotable moral message going 
against technocracy’s striving for usefulness, and matching Shakespeare’s lack of moral tub-
thumping in his plays (a characteristic for which they are so often revered). 
Or consider the role played by classical music, which in the World State appears to 
have been ‘whisk[ed]’ (BNW 29) into oblivion by those who, like Mond, have accepted the 
Fordian logics that proscribe its existence. Classical music is ‘bunk’, nonsense, 
incomprehensible to a world that no longer has any use for it. Synthetic music machines and 
scent organs manufacture the indulgences that classical compositions once facilitated, their 
imitation melodies ‘reassuringly’ (BNW 97) calming and ‘delightfully refreshing’ (BNW 145) 
their audiences rather than evoking a problematic but superseded cultural yesteryear. Jazz 
provides similar fulfilments, the synthetic music played by Calvin Stopes and his Sixteen 
Sexophonists at the Westminster Abbey Cabaret exemplifying Huxley’s aversion to what in 
‘Silence is Golden’ (1929) he saw as jazz’s ‘loud vulgarity of brassy guffaw and caterwauling 
sentiment’ (HCE2 20). Yet by means of a very precise linguistic strategy Brave New World 
contradicts, and implicitly rejects, such destructive ‘whisking’, again disclosing a tension 
between the diegetic and extra-diegetic levels of the text. When at the level of narrative 
plotting classical music is ostensibly side-lined, Huxley reintroduces classical musical 
terminology at the level of narrative vocabulary. As a result, he locates synthetic and 
olfactory ‘music’ in historical and lexical contexts that re-authorize the high artistic past at 
exactly those moments when it seems most thoroughly obscured. In the cabaret scene the 
gradual sounding of an erotically charged chord takes the form of ‘a diminuendo sliding 
gradually, through quarter tones, down, down’ (BNW 66), whereas later in the text a fragrant 
‘Herbal Capriccio’ conveys its aromas with ‘rippling arpeggios of thyme and lavender’ 
(BNW 145, emphases added). Shortly afterwards a music machine emits a high note far above 
the most extreme capacities of the human voice, thereby diminishing the achievement of even 
Lucrezia Aguiari, who once famously impressed Leopold Mozart with her vocal dexterity 
(BNW 145). History is in such moments anything but ‘bunk’, anything but erased by the 
modern machineries with which it is said to have been replaced. Indeed, these formal 
conflicts foreground classical music and its vocabularies even as Brave New World registers 
their absence ‘within’ the story, repossessing high art from the technocratic doctrines that 
elsewhere claim its desuetude. 
All of which is to say that the relationship between high art and technocracy in Brave 
New World is fraught with complexity, and that the connections between Huxley’s thoughts 
on culture and society and the values he explored in this text are far from straightforward. 
What seems clear, however, is that in the late 1920s and early 1930s Huxley was disturbed by 
the influence of the machine upon humanity in the postwar period, and that he was uncertain 
about what sort of role the creative individual might meaningfully play in a post-Fordian 
epoch. As Huxley’s essay ‘The Outlook for American Culture’ demonstrates, he accepted the 
labour-saving benefits of the machine yet bemoaned the fact that a more leisured age meant a 
more passive, increasingly standardized, more easily manipulated, and generally less cultured 
world. During the Depression these problems had become even more distinct. As Huxley 
wrote in ‘The Victory of Art over Humanity’ (1931), the ‘tragedy of the machine’ was that it 
had liberated the world from ‘the intolerable load of mere drudgery’ while simultaneously 
depriving ‘the overwhelming majority of men and women of the possibility, the very hope, of 
even the most modest creative activity’ (HCE3 282). Humanity had become its own rival, 
‘staggering under the blows received in the course of this disastrous conflict with the 
organized forces of its own intelligence’ (HCE3 283). Brave New World adopts a conflicted 
position in response to this scenario. Depending on how one reads the text (and here I am 
simplifying things somewhat), Huxley either seems to be satirizing such a predicament as a 
questioner of hierarchical models of society, inviting his readers to free themselves from the 
standardizing effects of the machine age in the process; or to be outlining a technocratic, 
profoundly hierarchical, and nerve-jangling solution to that same quandary in which, within 
certain predetermined limits, and to return again to ‘The Outlook for American Culture’, 
‘men and women are guaranteed a decent human existence’ and ‘are given every opportunity 
to develop such talents as they possess, and where those with the greatest talent rule’ (HCE3 
192). Yet however one reads Brave New World, in 1931 Huxley suggested that the solution to 
a disorganized, progressively more anarchic civilization lay in a centrally planned ‘world-
wide adjustment of production to consumption […] – in a word, a general agreement to make 
some universally valid sense out of our babel of separate and private achievements’ (HCE3 
285). 
An ‘adjustment’ along these lines was exactly what American Technocracy promised 
to bring about in Depression-era America. Although the idea of technocracy can claim a 
lineage going back several centuries, the first stirrings of the American Technocracy 
movement occurred circa 1919 in New York’s Greenwich Village, where Loeb happened to 
live in a flat above Scott.12 That year, influenced by Thorstein Veblen’s progressive 
economics and the scientific management philosophies associated with such figures as 
Frederick Taylor and Henry Laurence Gantt, Howard Scott established the Technical 
Alliance, whose purpose was to compile ‘a mammoth statistical survey of energy sources in 
North America’ that would identify causes of inefficiency in the industrial sector and project 
the impact of waste upon national living standards.13 Other members of the Alliance included 
Charles Steinmeitz, the head of the research laboratory at General Electric; Alice Burrows, 
deputy director of the U.S. Department of Education; and Veblen, whose ideas formed the 
foundation upon which Scott developed his analysis of America’s industrial problems. 
Among the groups who became interested in Scott’s activities were the Industrial Workers of 
the World, the so-called ‘Wobblies’, who employed him as their research director from 1920 
until 1921, and under whose auspices he published articles exploring the links between 
industrialism, society, and machinic thought. He claimed that society could be better 
understood (and improved) by rooting social policy in measurements of energy usage rather 
than in capitalistic production for profit. The Technical Alliance dissipated in 1921, but the 
policies it advanced would return to public view in 1932 when Scott, in league with Walter 
Rautenstrauch (the chairman of Columbia University’s Department of Industrial 
Engineering), Dal Hitchcock, Frederick L. Ackerman, M. King Hubbert, and others, formed 
the Committee on Technocracy, whose goal was to address ‘the inability of businessmen to 
curb their quest for profit in the interest of social harmony’ and to empower engineers to 
‘take up the responsibility of reorganizing supply and demand.’14 
The Committee on Technocracy lasted until January 1933, by which time it had 
claimed that the socio-economic planning of the day was backward-looking and 
unsatisfactorily scientific. More precisely, the Committee urged that the links between the 
market, labour, and social change should be understood quantitatively by charting patterns of 
energy consumption rather than by debating supposedly antiquated ‘principles of right, 
equity, propriety, duty, belief and taste as stabilized in the days of the handicraft guilds of 
Central Europe.’15 Scott’s ambition was to look past such archaic standards, as he saw them, 
in order to locate what he thought was a more clear-sighted and more equitable set of 
attitudes towards labour and social structures. He stated that the Committee offered ‘no 
solution’ to America’s economic crises, but nevertheless proposed that the way forward lay in 
abandoning the price-system, with its concomitant ‘wish-fulfilling thought and romantic 
concepts of value’, which would be replaced by a physicalist account of wealth as a 
conversion of ‘available energy into use-forms and services.’16 Put another way, energy 
consumption – rather than monetary exchange – was to become the basic measure of labour 
interactions, which would be reduced to a minimum. Such claims were inseparable from the 
Committee’s insistence that American society was inadequately calibrated to the labour-
saving potential of modern industrial machines, whose deployment, for Scott and his allies, 
proliferated rather than eliminated waste, increased rather than reduced unemployment, and 
threatened a catastrophe that would dwarf the upheavals wrought by the Wall Street Crash. 
The answer was to calibrate technology more precisely in line with human needs and, so the 
logic implied, to place an engineering class in charge of the American nation, whose ailments 
would be cured by scientific judgement.17 
Many commentators agreed that the Technocrats had identified several highly 
important problems. Scott certainly found his admirers. Theodore Dreiser, for instance, wrote 
in a 1932 letter to Scott that there was ‘something amazingly iron and powerful’ about him, 
and that he gave Dreiser ‘the feeling of a titan made of bronze.’18 At the same time, a 
substantial body of critics, including Ford Madox Ford and H. L. Mencken, formed around 
the movement and around Scott in particular.19 Attacks on Technocracy at this early stage 
ranged from accusations of unoriginality – Scott’s opposition to the price system, for 
instance, left him open to the charge that he had plagiarized the bulk of Technocracy from 
Frederick Soddy’s Wealth, Virtual Wealth, and Debt (1926) – to more straightforwardly 
satirical claims that the movement’s ideas were indecipherable.20 Before long, filmmakers 
began ridiculing Technocracy in such films as Frank Lamont’s Techno-Crazy and the W. C. 
Fields comedy International House (both 1933). Gordon Phillips, appearing as ‘Lucio’ in The 
Manchester Guardian in January 1933, wrote in his comic poem ‘Abracadabra’ that it ‘would 
be hypocrisy’ to say he understood the ‘finer shades of meaning | In this term so newly 
heard’, and saluted Technocracy ‘as one leaning | On another bright boss-word!’21 
Understanding the movement’s ‘finer shades of meaning’ was made even more problematic 
when Scott attempted to silence his critics in a radio address but instead delivered ‘a 
rambling, confusing, and most uninspiring address’.22 Scott’s performance prompted 
Rautenstrauch to leave the Committee on Technocracy and was a factor in the movement’s 
splitting into two opposed factions. The first group, the Continental Committee on 
Technocracy, was initially loyal to Scott but in time came to be dominated by Loeb, who 
published Life in a Technocracy in 1933 (having written it three years beforehand).23 Scott 
formed Technocracy, Inc. in March 1933, at which point this branch of the movement started 
to adopt the grey-toned partisan regalia that later in the 1930s adorned its offices and many of 
its publications, giving it a paramilitary, quasi-fascist temperament, and opened and closed its 
meetings with a gesture based on the hand salute used by the American armed forces.24 
Huxley had long been interested in comparable symbols of office, as his depictions of 
Everard Webley and the Brotherhood of British Freemen in Point Counter Point (1928) 
attest. From this perspective, it’s not surprising that the civilization depicted in Brave New 
World has its fair share of official cryptograms and state-sanctioned gesticulations, including 
the ‘signs of the T’ – variously an emblem of maleness, a salute, a zipper fastening, a book 
stamp, and a representation of triumphant technocracy – that comprise many of its ceremonial 
appurtenances. One of the first qualities of Huxley’s World State to be emphasized is its 
greyness. The very first line of the book introduces us to the Central London Hatchery, a 
‘squat grey building of only thirty-four storeys’ (BNW 1), and subsequently we learn about 
the grey clothing worn by Alpha children (BNW 22) and the ‘blank grey eyes’ (BNW 56) of 
the attendants who take care of Bernard’s plane. Indeed, we might add the text’s emphasis on 
monochromatic self-fashioning to the list of Technocratic idiosyncrasies that Roger 
Luckhurst has argued Brave New World seems improbably to predict, along with Scott’s 
gradual drift towards authoritarianism and his interest in Pavlovian behavioural 
conditioning.25 By the end of the 1930s Technocracy, Inc. had been permeated by ‘[a] 
uniform gray’, its pamphlets adopting the colour and individual members painting their 
automobiles in its tones, while ‘[g]ray […] double-breasted suits, worn over gray shirts with 
blue neckties appeared in increasing numbers after 1937.’26 Long before that time, Huxley 
had magnificently imagined a triumphant, monotone technocracy that critics would 
eventually see as having foreshadowed American Technocracy, warts and all.27 
However we construe the role of technocracy in general in Brave New World – as an 
object of satire or as something of which Huxley for a time questioningly approved, or both – 
the commitment to high art disclosed by the text’s structural contradictions makes for a 
revealing comparison with Life in a Technocracy, in which Loeb insisted that the ‘highest 
type of work’ is ‘the creative’ (LT 58); argued that the ‘control of anything of the appeal of 
which is subjective, such as the theater, or painting, should not be entrusted to the state’ (LT 
127); and contemplated a utopian (albeit improbable) future wherein the artistic imagination 
has become so fully integrated into socio-economic life that the life of the artist (as a discrete 
specialism) is no longer necessary (LT 169). While Loeb insisted that Life in a Technocracy 
amounted to ‘merely a tentative sketch of the new heaven or ideal state’ (LT 192) that might 
be adopted by America to solve its economic and industrial problems, nevertheless he clearly 
hoped to use the text to convey his support for government by technical specialists and to 
oppose Scott’s rejection of culture. Loeb wrote in The Way it Was (1959) that Scott 
‘disparaged the arts and expected technical men to take charge of society when the price 
system collapsed.’28 Life in a Technocracy, by contrast, reconciles art and technocracy in a 
way that preserves the former within a technocratic future. Loeb’s fortunate position as a 
‘wealthy man of leisure’ had a role to play here, but Life in a Technocracy can be read as a 
sincere effort to outline a technocratic vision of society within which the arts play a 
distinctive, ‘uplift[ing]’ (LT 141) part.29 Loeb thus differed from Scott, who stated that 
‘useless art forms’ could be supplied by machine-produced replacements (another link to 
Huxley’s World State, in which music is created synthetically), and echoed Huxley’s 
contemporaneous commitment to the high arts within the scope of a wider, yet short-lived, 
attraction to technocratic principles, a position with which he wrestled throughout his work of 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, and above all in Brave New World.30  
Loeb followed Scott by maintaining that capitalism should ‘make way for a more 
efficient and more just system of distribution’ (LT 30), one that would drop the profit motive, 
adopt a universal unit of work (the erg), force industry to utilize fully the principles of 
science, and eliminate the injustice of accidental and hereditary privilege.31 The system Loeb 
had in mind would divide itself between a technocratic industrial infrastructure, on the one 
hand, and a sphere within which man’s creative urges could be ‘deflected to the production of 
non-essentials’ (LT 52), on the other – the latter being dependent on, but not coterminous 
with, the industrial sectors that would allow its existence. Such a framework would force all 
citizens to work for a minimum of sixteen hours per week (just as Scott had suggested; see 
LT 37 and 62), and give them a guaranteed income and satisfy their material wants and needs 
(LT 84), in exchange for ‘ample scope’ (LT 60) to pursue self-bettering activities without 
allowing any one person to ‘acquire more goods than everyone is entitled to’ (LT 64). Certain 
individuals within the system would, on top of their minimum working week, opt to devote 
themselves to improving the industrial infrastructure. Others, by contrast, would be 
‘marvelously released’ (LT 69) to ‘seek self-realization outside the producing system’ (LT 64) 
via imaginative and artistic efforts. The goal was to ‘utilize man’s egoism for getting the 
necessary productive work done, and his vanity for continuing the experimentation required 
if the technique of living is to go on developing’ (LT 71). 
Art in such a utopia of plenty would enjoy government protection but remain free 
from state control (LT 127). Its function would be to allow citizens to express themselves 
unhindered by capitalist logics (‘the outrageous Mysticism of Money’; LT 138). Loeb 
acknowledged that capitalism generated art, but he was far from sanguine about the long-term 
benefits of such cultural and architectural forms as ‘metropolises, jazz, advertisements, 
success epics, girl shows, comic strips, sporting pages, the movies, [and] the talkies’ on the 
grounds that he deemed capitalism ‘a hothouse’ that ‘fosters growth’ while producing fruit 
that ‘lacks taste’ (LT 133). Although Loeb contended that the capitalist era had made possible 
innovations, such as the cinema and radio, that could be counted among ‘the greatest boons’ 
(LT 134) ever given to humanity, he argued that capitalism itself was not ‘conducive to a 
good life’ and thus that it was incapable of enabling ‘expressions’ that ‘satisfy’ (LT 137). 
Indeed, he is likely to have had Huxley (and figures like him) in mind when he wrote that 
lowbrow arts were ‘sweeping across the world to the bewilderment and lament of every 
conservative disciple of the older cultures’ (LT 130). Implicitly addressing such disciples, 
Loeb assured his readers that via technocracy modern artists would find ‘other ideals to 
vaunt’ (LT 141) than those encouraged by capitalist protocols, and that artworks ‘of the older 
cultures’ would be preserved by the state (LT 129). The result would be a social edifice 
committed to spirit- and life-affirming values rather than to profit motives, and a world 
enriched by the best art of modernity and antiquity combined. 
Put like this, Life in a Technocracy answered a range of Huxleyan anxieties, in 
particular his concerns in ‘Machinery, Psychology, and Politics’ about the subordination of 
artistic innovation to rationalizing tenets and the difficulties simultaneously involved in 
accepting ‘the ethic of the machine’ (HCE3 220), seeking ‘the material advantages which 
accrue to those living in a mechanized world’, and protecting the mental benefits of the pre-
mechanical past (HCE3 221). In other respects, however, Life in a Technocracy differs 
substantially from the account of the future articulated in Brave New World and from the 
views about socio-political reform Huxley articulated in the years surrounding its publication. 
The most obvious difference is textural. Life in a Technocracy is a polemic; Brave New 
World is a literary fiction. Loeb’s opinions are easily read off the page; Huxley’s, by contrast, 
even when his opinions seem straightforwardly ‘present’ in Brave New World, are 
nevertheless problematized by its literariness, the text only ever yielding its ideological 
freight reluctantly, if at all. Even if Life in a Technocracy seems to parrot the narrative 
content of Brave New World in numerous ways – for example, as if to echo the sports-mad 
inhabitants of the World State, Loeb predicts that ‘[d]uring the first century of technocracy, 
sport will probably flourish as it never has before’ (LT 128) – the consumerist World State 
could not be any more distinct from Loeb’s technocracy, in which the ‘anti-social incentive 
called profit would be abolished’ (LT 131) and ending would most certainly not be better than 
mending (see BNW 42), and where no one would desire ‘to replenish their equipment 
frequently and to expend it continuously’ (LT 121).32 
Even more significantly, whereas Huxley argued in ‘The Outlook for American 
Culture’ that the ideal state ‘is one in which there is a material democracy controlled by an 
aristocracy of intellect’ (HCE3 192), Loeb disagreed with ‘the system invented by the 
thinkers of conservative India, a system of stratified castes and wholesale renunciations’, 
favouring instead a framework that would depend on ‘specialization of function’ yet enable 
individuals to possess ‘equal and absolute economic security’ rather than feel ‘resigned to the 
lot into which [they] may be born’ (LT 174).33 On this central point Loeb and Huxley were 
fundamentally opposed, Huxley countering Loeb’s liberal perspective with writings calling 
for a ‘revolt against political democracy’ (HCE3 191) and for power ‘concentrated in the 
hands of intelligent and active oligarchies’ (HCE3 192), two inclinations represented and 
arguably extolled in Brave New World. Likewise, Huxley and Loeb took very different 
stances on the problem of eugenics. Huxley later claimed in ‘What is Happening to Our 
Population?’ (1934) that ‘a nation in which the number of halfwits is steadily growing is a 
nation whose potential efficiency is being steadily impaired’ (HCE3 400), thereby echoing 
the more uncompromising rhetorics of productivity used by Scott and reiterating the 
eugenicism of the World State. Loeb went in a different direction, stating that ‘breeding with 
specific individuals for specific purposes’ would not be contemplated without a ‘superman’ 
to ‘supervise the job’, even though he felt that a technocratic abandoning of ‘the false ideals 
promulgated by late social eras’ would ‘produce a race of man superior in quality to any 
[then] known on earth’ (LT 178). Yet Huxley’s commitment to the high arts – to what Loeb 
called those expressions ‘fraught with meaning, the only meaning that matters’ (LT 167) – 
aligns him with a technocratic defence of the aesthetic, in spite of the fact that Huxley was 
not committed to the specific form of technocracy that Loeb defended in Life in a 
Technocracy and elsewhere. 
And this leads me to repeat my fundamental point: namely, that Huxley’s potential 
compatibility with Loeb not only establishes a parallel with the American Technocracy 
movement in particular, but also shows yet again how Huxley’s interest in ‘technocratic 
control over reproduction and social reform in the early 1930s’ locates Brave New World in 
exactly those contexts from which commentators such as Niethammer have sought to 
distance it.34 More recently, Ronald T. Sion has argued that ‘of all the major commentators 
on the modern threat of technocratic arrogance, Huxley remains perhaps the most widely read 
and influential.’35 This is undoubtedly true. It is also the case, however, that Huxley remains 
perhaps the most influentially ambivalent critic of technocracy, arrogant or otherwise, and 
that there are intriguing connections between his views on the links between art and 
technocracy and those espoused by Loeb (thereby forcing us to place historically his 
commentaries on ‘the modern threat of technocratic arrogance’ with greater care). Consider 
Huxley’s and Loeb’s views regarding those who choose, or are forced, to live outside 
technocratic systems. Loeb notes that ‘a few zealots’ may decide to end their contract with 
technocracy (LT 40) and the ‘two main categories’ (LT 60) of self-realization – scientific and 
imaginative – it facilitates. Doing so, however, would mean ‘living by Stone Age standards 
except for borrowed tools and gifts, [and] would be disagreeable for most people’ (LT 40). 
Leaving technocracy in Loeb’s account means leaving the system as a whole. In Brave New 
World, by contrast, independence is available to those who ‘“have got too self-consciously 
individual to fit into community-life”’ (BNW 200), as Mond puts it; is not unpleasant (though 
it appears so in prospect); and structurally supports the technocracy to which it is notionally 
opposed. The exile that Bernard Marx and Helmholtz Watson face represents not exile from 
the World State per se but signifies another form of containment within it, and which is, 
presumably, still within the power of the World State as a governing agency. Artistic freedom 
is for Loeb a product of the system. For Huxley, artistic freedom comes about despite the 
system. Yet in both instances technocracy facilitates a realm in which imagination (and 
presumably the creation and enjoyment of high art) is possible, and in this sense the 
reciprocal distinction ‘between mechanic and liberal occupations’ that Brave New World 
examines approximates at least in part to the bond eulogized by Life in a Technocracy. 
It’s worth reiterating that Loeb and Huxley wrote in very different ways, and that 
Brave New World could hardly be called a socio-political manifesto in the way that Life in a 
Technocracy more easily can be, despite Loeb’s insistence that the text was meant as a rough 
outline of a possible future. Huxley described Brave New World in a 1931 letter to G. Wilson 
Knight as ‘a Swiftian novel about the Future’ that would delineate the ‘strange and appalling 
effects on feeling, “instinct” and general weltanschauung of the application of psychological, 
physiological and mechanical knowledge to the fundamentals of human life’ (AHL 353), so it 
would be a strange reading indeed that sought uncomplicatedly to equate the text with a 
technocratic account of the human condition when technocracy is one of the very phenomena 
that Brave New World satirizes. Brave New World is certainly more nuanced in its 
questioning attitude towards technocracy than such texts as Michael Arlen’s Man’s Mortality 
(1933), in which technocratic systems that seek ‘to dragoon the nations of the world into a 
colossal scheme of tidiness’ are rebuked more candidly.36 What is intriguing here is that in 
Brave New World, a text routinely characterized as one of the twentieth century’s most 
powerful invectives against technocratic thinking, we find a relationship between artistic-
intellectual creativity and technocracy within whose terms the former can be preserved, rather 
than annihilated, by the latter. 
A brief comparison of Huxley’s writings with those of the American Technocrats 
shows from a new angle how Brave New World appeared in the midst of an international 
debate regarding the roles played by technology and by non-utilitarian high art in socio-
political life, and that the similarities between Huxley’s and Loeb’s interventions into this 
debate – between their respective ‘signs of the T’, in effect – should prompt us more 
precisely to discuss Brave New World in relation to the American cultural-historical contexts 
with which it resonates. Despite Huxley’s well-known concerns about Americanization, and 
notwithstanding their incorporation into Brave New World, the parallels between Huxley and 
Loeb suggest a more complex cultural-historical state of affairs than has hitherto been 
acknowledged. Given the timings, Huxley is unlikely to have based Brave New World on the 
activities of the American Technocrats in particular (though we know he corresponded with 
Loeb in the early 1920s), but it seems that he wrote the text partially to find some way to 
reconcile his interest in technocracy with his commitment to, and desire to preserve, the high 
arts from the more reductively quantitative ideologies of the period.37 Huxley certainly didn’t 
think that history was bunk. But like Loeb he would have disagreed with Scott regarding art’s 
role in modernity, and thus would have relished the ending of Phillips’s assault on Scott in 
‘Abracadabra’: 
 
Technocracy! Technocracy! 
A horrid doubt breaks in; 
For verbal aristocracy 
Sometimes has humbler kin. 
Is there, by chance, distillable, 
If down, its weight were shrunk, 
That baleful monosyllable 
The older, brisker ‘bunk’?38 
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